




Emerging from a decade of political and economic chaos, the
People's Republic of China (PRC) has embarked upon a course of
economic modernization. A keystone of the new economic policy is
increased independence of provincial and municipal authorities
from the central government, particularly in foreign trade mat-
ters. Together with political reform, the economic reforms pushed
by Deng Xiaoping and his allies are designed to spur productivity
by reducing the role of centralized state planning and by relying
upon market incentives implemented by local authorities and
enterprises.'
Foreign trade is a critical element in China's new economic
policies. The domestic turmoil of the Cultural Revolution com-
pelled China's leaders to turn their attention and energies inward,
further aggravating China's relative isolation from international
trade and economic currents. The return of civil order and
political stability has enabled China's planners to focus on foreign
contacts and industrial and agricultural needs. The expansion of
foreign trade, particularly with the United States following the
Shanghai Communique,' provides the PRC with the opportunity to
* Attorney in the Office of the Assistant General Counsel for International Trade,
Department of Commerce; A.B., Sweet Briar College, 1965; M.A., Oxford University, 1974;
J.D., George Washington University Law School, 1974.
' In a major speech to the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) on September 7, 1980,
Premier Hua Guofeng characterized the economic reform program as one which would
change centralized management by the state by instituting, among other specific measures,
the delegation of powers to local authorities. Hua attacked over-centralization as inhibiting
the "initiative of the grass-roots administrative offices, the enterprises and the workers,"
and obstructing the "flow between different links in production and circulation." MAIN
DOCUMENTS OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE FIFTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, 168, 177, 148
(Foreign Language Press, 1980) [hereinafter cited as THIRD SESSION]. The decentralization
measures affecting Chinese domestic enterprises are part of the economic reform program
but, because of this paper's focus on foreign trade, are not discussed.
' The Shanghai Communique was signed in February 1972. Diplomatic relations were
established on January 1, 1979. Other important dates in the re-establishment of U.S.-P.R.C.
trading relations include the bilateral trade agreement (including the grant of Most-
Favored Nation [MFN] status to the PRC, which went into effect February 1, 1980;
authorization to the Export-Import Bank to support U.S. exports to the PRC (April 2. 1980);
and the signing of agreements covering aviation, textiles, maritime matters and consular af-
fairs (September 17, 1980). See DEPT OF COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., DOING BUSINESS IN
CHINA (revised Nov. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA].
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obtain the equipment, technology, and know-how it requires to im-
plement current policies. The "four modernizations" -agriculture,
science and technology, industry, and defense 3- provide the foun-
dation upon which China intends to join the front ranks of the
world's industrialized powers by the year 2000. The technology
and equipment necessary to achieve the modernizations must be
paid for with hard currency earned in part through sales abroad
of Chinese manufactured goods and natural resources.4
Throughout its history, China has retained a deep sense of na-
tional unity and identity. Although the provinces and great cities
exercised considerable political and economic power before and
after the Communist victory in 1949, they were never completely
independent of, or opposed to, the nation-state. In 1949, trium-
phant Communist leaders set up a unitary system of government
under the leadership of the Party. The role of the provinces and
other local units was acknowledged in successive Constitutions,5
but the pattern of Chinese Communist constitutional development
differed fundamentally from that of a federal system, such as that
created by the United States Constitution. The Chinese models,
including the most recent Constitution in 1978, emphasize the role
of state and party organs, at the expense of provincial, municipal,
and other local authorities.
Although the current trend toward decentralization-the grant-
ing of increased autonomy in economic activity to local authorities
and enterprises-is new, it is not unique in China's recent past.
Previous efforts were made to decentralize economic planning and
management in 1956-58, the early 1960s, and in 1970. The decen-
tralization of the past two years differs, however, in one impor-
tant respect from previous policies. Earlier decentralization direc-
tives were designed to improve China's domestic economic
management. Under the present scheme, new trade institutions
are being established in a number of municipalities and provinces
The four modernizations were announced by Zhou Enlai in January 1975.
China's exports consist primarily of crude oil, coal, foodstuffs, handicrafts, simple
machine tools, textiles, ores, and bicycles. Imports include equipment and technologies for
oil exploration, mining, power generation, and aviation, agricultural inputs (fertilizers,
pesticides, etc.), petrochemicals, consumer goods, grain, and other foodstuffs. See DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORT No. 80-25, EAST-WEST TRADE
UPDATE: A, COMMERCIAL FACT SHEET FOR U.S. BUSINESS, 13-15 (Aug. 1980). See also CON-
GRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-
WEST TRADE 273 (Nov. 1979) [hereinafter cited as TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE]; and
Smith, China's Reappraisal Hampers U.S. Trade, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1980, at D 17, col. 1.
' CONST. (PRC) 1954, 1975 & 1978.
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and "Special Economic Zones" are being developed for the pur-
poses of promoting foreign trade and improving foreign trade
management. The foreign trade aspect of current decentralization
does not create any distinction between foreign and domestic
planning in terms of their relative importance to Chinese leaders,
nor is there any contradiction between domestic and foreign trade
in the granting of increased autonomy in trade matters to local
units. However, the current policy does focus on China's recogni-
tion that its economic growth and prosperity are linked firmly to
trade, and that the earlier goal of self-sufficiency, even if
desirable, is unattainable. The recent creation of institutions at
the local level to deal more efficiently with foreign business in-
terests and investments has been matched by efforts to enact
commercial legislation, which will accommodate trade with foreign
companies. The joint venture law' and corporate7 and individual
income tax laws8 will be complemented by laws on patents, con-
tracts, corporations, an accounting system for joint ventures, and
regulations on foreign exchange.9
Decentralization is, of course, an ongoing process. New local in-
stitutions continue to appear, assuming novel roles and burdens in
promoting and developing China's foreign trade. At this early
stage, confusion and uncertainty are evident, and there are
reports of problems with economic reform as well as difficulties ir
' LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON JOINT VENTURES USING CHINESE AND
FOREIGN INVESTMENT (adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Con-
gress, July 1, 1979, revised Sept. 2, 1980). See Note, Foreign Investment in the People's
Republic of China: Compensation Trade, Joint Ventures, Industrial Property Protection
and Dispute Settlements, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COmP. L. 233 (1980).
CORPORATE INCOME TAX LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, (Sept. 2, 1980).
8 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Sept. 2, 1980). See 11
GA. J. INT'L & COmP. L. 373 (1981).
' Interview with Zhou Xuancheng, Vice-Chairman of the Foreign Investment Control
Commission (FICC), in Beijing (Nov. 18, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Zhou interview]. Regula-
tions on joint ventures using Chinese and foreign investment, labor management, and
regulations on the special economic zones in Guangdong Province have also been pro-
mulgated. REGULATIONS ON SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN GUANGDONG PROVINCE, Approved
by 15th Sess. of the Standing Comm. of the Fifth Nat'l People's Congress on Aug. 26, 1980
(published in 1980 CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE, Supp. to No. 6) (hereinafter cited as 1980
REGULATIONS ON SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES). Despite the number and variety of books and
articles on law in China, there are few experts in Communist Chinese law, either in China
or the United States, due to the scarcity of law on which to be expert. Hsia, Sources of Law
in the People's Republic of China Recent Developments, 14 INT'L LAW. 25 (1980). For
general background on Chinese law, see Cohen, China's Legal System, in TRADE WITH
CHINA 126 (P. Boardman ed. 1974); Edwards, The Legal Framework of Chinese Trade, in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA 63 (H. Holtzmann, ed. 1976); and Lubman,
On Understanding Chinese Law and Legal Institutions, 62 A.B.A.J. 597 (1976).
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achieving decentralization.'" There are also indications that the
established trade bureaucracy at the national level, the Ministry
of Foreign Trade in particular, is opposed to the devolution of
economic decisionmaking from the central institutions to local
units." So far, however, the problems appear to have affected only
the pace of decentralization, not its substance.
This article constitutes a preliminary assessment of the course
and progress of decentralization and focuses on the new trade
institutions that have arisen in the three municipalities of Beijing,
Shanghai, and Tianjin, 2 and the provinces of Fujian and
Guangdong. Also discussed are the new Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) being set up in Fujian and Guangdong. By way of
background, a brief examination is made of earlier decentraliza-
tion policies, and of the constitutional position of provinces and
other subnational administrative units. The creation, functions,
and progress of the new trade institutions are also considered. A
discussion of various problems encountered by the localities, the
central government, and foreign businesses follows. Finally,
preliminary conclusions are drawn on the basis of present
knowledge about the institutions, and judgments are made regard-
ing the prospects for continued decentralization. However, at this
point, it is not possible to reach definitive conclusions about the
future of local trade autonomy; or to assert with finality how suc-
cessfully local entities have performed or will perform in the
future. The Chinese willingly confess to inexperience in interna-
tional trade matters. Accordingly, the new trade entities and new
trading techniques may require refinement to meet the needs of
the Chinese and their foreign business partners. Trial and error
appears inevitable during this course of foreign trade develop-
ment.
II. EARLIER POLICIES OF DECENTRALIZATION
Fresh from their triumph over the Kuomintang, the Chinese
Communist authorities adopted a Soviet model of economic
management and planning, which emphasized a high degree of
,0 An editorial in the People's Daily on December 2, 1980 indicated problems with the
progress of "readjustment," which is aimed at correcting sectoral imbalances in the
economy, and called for more central control and planning. FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMA-
TION SERVICE-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA L-19, L-20 (daily rep., Dec. 2, 1980).
I /d.
1! The "San da Shi" is another name for these three great cities of China.
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central planning and control.13 The first Five Year Plan
(1953-1957)14 was characterized by the development of vertically-
organized industrial ministries and centralized control over
natural resources, industrial plans, and distribution networks."3
One of the primary goals of the Communists was to establish the
PRC as a major industrial and military power. Other goals in-
cluded realignment of the geographic distribution of industry by
shifting economic power from the prosperous northeast and
coastal regions to less developed areas, and the creation of a more
equitable system of government services."
Production goals were set by the central government by each
industrial ministry and directed to specific enterprises under
direct ministerial management.17 The role of provincial authorities
was limited to fulfilling a similar planning process for those enter-
prises under local, rather than central, ministerial control. As a
result, local authorities controlled only one-fourth of all state-
managed industries.8 Centralized planning and decisionmaking
achieved some of the goals. A more equitable distribution system
of goods, and services was achieved, the rate of capital formation
and direct investment increased,19 and the nation was able to con-
centrate its resources to ensure priority of construction.0
However, economic efficiency was not achieved. By 1956, local
dissatisfaction with the Soviet model appeared. Complaints were
made that the "excessive, over-detailed and rigid control by the
central departments fettered the enthusiasm of the localities and
the enterprises."2 In 1958, decentralization directives announced
"s Lardy, Economic Planning in the People's Republic of China.: Central-Provincial Fiscal
Relations (1975), reprinted in JOINT ECON. COMM., 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS.. CHINA: A REASSESS-
MENT OF THE ECONOMY 94 (hereinafter cited as JOINT ECON. COMM.); see also Lardy, Cen-
tralization and Decentralization in China's Fiscal Management, 61 CHINA Q. 25 (March
1975); and Luosun, Changes in China's Economic Management, 5 BEIJING REV. 21, 22 (1980).
" Luosun, supra note 13, at 21. Economic plans since 1949 have been: First Five Year
Plan (1953-1957); Second Five Year Plan (1958-1962); the Three Year Readjustment Period
(1963-1965); Third Five Year Plan (1966-1970); Fourth Five Year Plan (1971-1975); and the
Fifth Five Year Plan (1976-1981), which was incorporated into the ten year draft economic
program (1976-1985). See Tian, One Step Back, Two Steps Forward, 29 BEIJING REV. 15, 18
(1980).
" JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE-CHINA REPORT, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS No. 54, at
10-11 (Apr. 8, 1980) (Foreign Broadcast Information Service).
" JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 13, at 95.
" Id. at 97.
" Id. at 98.
" Id. See Luosun, supra note 13, at 22.
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the transfer of administrative authority of eighty-seven percent of
the enterprises formerly under the central authorities to the prov-
inces, municipalities, and autonomous regions.' Enhanced authori-
ty in the areas of taxation, price controls, economic planning, and
financial management was delegated to local units.' However, by
June 1959, it became clear that the experiment was a failure. Im-
balances in the national economy resulted from over-ambitious
targets and over-emphasis on development of the iron and steel in-
dustries." Control of the most important enterprises were return-
ed to the central ministries.
The shift from centralized management to decentralized and
back again between 1958-1960 demonstrates China's search for a
balance between two policies. At one extreme, it is argued that
economic efficiency is realized by decentralizing and allowing sub-
national units to participate in economic planning and decision-
making. At the other extreme is a centralized model, which allows
distribution of natural resources and government services by vir-
tue of an overall state plan, with subordinate units conforming to
directives issued from the central bureaucracy. 5
A second attempt to decentralize occurred in 1964, when
measures were taken to delegate the disposition of investments in
construction in nineteen non-industrial branches (such as banking
and communications) to local authorities. Under this plan,
localities had the power to allocate funds and materials. However,
compared to the decentralization steps taken in 1958-1959, the
changes were insignificant. 6 In 1970, a third attempt was made
when management of approximately 2,000 civilian industrial
enterprises was transferred from the central authorities to local
governments. Management powers included control over
materials, capital construction, and finances.' However, none of
the three efforts had a significant impact on the ability of the cen-
tral government to control the distribution of economic resources.
Provincial authorities and the enterprises they operated never
had the power to act unilaterally, but were limited to operating
through state directives, and within the overall state plan.
Luosun, supra note 13, at 22.
23 JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 13, at 100.
' Luosun, supra note 13, at 22.
For a general discussion, see N. LARDY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION IN CHINA
(1978).
JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 13, at 11.




III. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PRC
The present Constitution, adopted by the National People's
Congress in March 1978, defines the People's Republic as a
"socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat."' Power
resides in "the people" and is exercised through the National Peo-
ple's Congress (NPC) at the national level and local people's con-
gresses at "various levels."30 However, leadership is defined in dif-
ferent terms than in the 1975 Constitution. The 1978 version
specifies that the people's congresses are to parallel more closely
the party hierarchy, which is described as the "core of the leader-
ship of the whole Chinese people."3 No question exists as to
whether the PRC constitutes a federal system. Article 4 describes
the PRC as a "unitary multinational state." Article 33 sets out the
administrative divisions of the state. At the first level are prov-
inces, followed by autonomous regions and municipalities directly
under the central government." Provinces and autonomous
regions are divided into autonomous prefectures, cities and coun-
ties, and autonomous counties. Municipalities, directly under the
central government, and other large cities, are divided into
districts and counties.
Within the National Autonomous Areas, the "organs of self-
government" (i.e. the people's congresses and revolutionary com-
mittees) may "make regulations in the exercise of autonomy" and
also "specific regulations," which, however, must be submitted to
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
(NPC) 3' For all other local subunits, the role of the local people's
congresses are described in article 36:
[To] ensure the observance and enforcement of the Constitution,
laws and decrees; ensure the implementation of the state plan;
make plans for local economic and cultural development and for
public utilities; examine and approve local economic plans,
budgets and final accounts; protect public property; maintain
public order; safeguard the rights of citizens and the equal
rights of minority nationalities and promote the development of
socialist revolution and socialist construction."4
CONST. (PRC) art. 1.
o Id. art. 3.
3, Id. art. 2.
Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are municipalities under direct control of the central
government and are administered as provinces.
CONST. (PRC) art. 39.
Id. art. 36.
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In addition, the local people's congresses are empowered to "adopt
and issue decisions within the limits of their authority as pre-
scribed by law." There is no further delineation of the types of
"decisions" the localities may make, nor of the limits imposed on
their "authority" as prescribed.
It is clear that local units of the PRC are strictly subordinate in
constitutional terms to the central government. Unlike the United
States Constitution, which decrees that "powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,"''
China's constitutional framework is centered on the national
government, with the provinces and other local units possessing
no independent political authority other than those powers de-
fined and circumscribed by the central government.
IV. CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE
STRUCTURE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
At the top of the economic policy and planning ladder are two
"supraministerial commissions": the State Planning Commission
and the State Economic Commission.37 The State Planning Com-
mission is responsible for promulgating the national economic
plan. The State Economic Commission determines how the plan
will be implemented. Both Commissions play crucial roles in
foreign trade at the planning stage. However, neither deals directly
with foreign companies, nor do they actually administer the work
of the trade ministries or of national foreign trade corporations."
Subordinate to the Commissions are industrial corporations, such
as the China Petroleum Corporation, which are responsible for
planning and production in their respective spheres in domestic
trade. The corporations act as consultants to the ministries to
which they are attached, and to the national foreign trade corpora-
tions.
Foreign trade corporations (FTCs), created under the Ministry
of Foreign Trade at the national level,' have been the chief organs
3 Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
3 For a detailed description of China's domestic and foreign trade structure, see DOING
BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 2, at 8.
s' Id. The other major commissions include the Energy Commission, Capital Construc-
tion, as well as the IECC/FICC.




for the conduct of foreign trade. Until the advent of the new trade
organs in the three municipalities and two provinces, the national
FTCs were the organizations responsible for dealing with foreign
businessmen. The FTCs negotiate the sale and purchase of goods
and materials on the basis of available supplies and on the re-
quirements of domestic enterprises. The FTCs have authority to
execute contracts with foreign firms." The industrial ministries,
such as the Ministry of Coal Industry, and their subordinate cor-
porations also conduct "foreign trade" by soliciting proposals and
information concerning purchases from foreign entities. Various
ministries, for example the Ministry of Metallurgical Industries,
have established import and export corporations to handle foreign
trade and investment activities."
Four central agencies, three of which were created recently,
have played an important role in the decentralization process: the
Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT), the Foreign Investment Control
Commission (FICC), the Import-Export Control Commission
(IECC), and the China International Trust and Investment Com-
mission (CITIC). The Ministry of Foreign Trade, the parent organ
for most of the FTCs, traditionally has been the predominant cen-
tral agency in foreign trade. Not surprisingly, it is the entity most
affected by decentralization and the transfer of authority to
subordinate trade units. Recent indications are that the MFT has
not acquiesced in the transfer of authority. The FICC, IECC, and
CITIC are newer, and although they perform functions at the top
of the trade decisionmaking level, they must also work directly or
indirectly with the new trade entities set up at the local level.
The FICC and IECC were established in 1979 following publica-
tion of the joint venture law. Both utilize the same staff and vice
premier (Gu Mu) and have similar responsibilities. According to a
prominent official of the FICC, its responsibilities are to:
1. examine and approve joint venture projects;
2. research and formulate laws, decrees, and regulations;
3. organize, consider, and conclude foreign economic coopera-
tion agreements; and
4. investigate and research the general state of international
economic development and trade."
,0 The relationship between the central FTCs and local FTCs is considered in Part V in-
fra.
" DoING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 2, at 4.
Address by L. Chu, China's Present Policy Toward Foreign Investment and Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investments, Washington Foreign Law Society (Jan.
21, 1981).
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Of these responsibilities, the FICC's chief task is to coordinate
and approve business arrangements between Chinese corpora-
tions and foreign firms.43 The IECC is the parent body of the
import-export commissions operating in the provinces and
municipalities." The FICC has authority to approve or disapprove
joint ventures and foreign investments." With the exception of
two provinces, Guangdong and Fujian, and the three
municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, cities and local
government units can approve joint ventures that cost less than
three million dollars. The selected cities and provinces have
authority to approve projects with an investment value of up to
five million dollars. All approvals above this amount must be
authorized by the FICC.46 All subnational units considering joint
ventures must use the same guidelines for approval as the FICC,
regardless of the size or value of the venture.47 In addition, all
local units are required to report to the FICC on any joint ven-
tures approved.48
Under the Regulations on the Registration of Joint Ventures
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment,49 joint ventures, following
approval by the FICC, must register with the General Ad-
ministration for Industry and Commerce, which then authorizes
its administrative sub-branches in the provinces and
municipalities to register the joint ventures. The local ad-
ministrative branches are empowered to "supervise and inspect"
joint ventures in the areas they govern.
Under the direction of the State Council, CITIC was in-
augurated in October 1979. CITIC operates in a representative
" Zhou interview, supra note 9. See also Comment, The PRC's Investment Control and
Import-Export Commissions, CHINA Bus. REV. 12 (Mar.-Apr. 1980) (hereinafter cited as In-
vestment Control). The FICCIIECC has eight bureaus: overall planning, technology acquisi-
tion, imports and exports, foreign investments, legislative, research and investigation,
general administrative, and advisors office.
" Investment Control, supra note 43, at 12. The IECC and FICC are both under the
leadership of Gu Mu.
"5 Zhou interview, supra note 9.
" The approval criteria for joint ventures have not yet been published. However, from
interviews with Chinese officials, it can be established that there are five standards used by
the FIC in considering proposed joint ventures: the capacity of the company to do the job;
available infrastructure; debts involved; availability of foreign currency to complete the
project; and adequate natural resources.
41 Zhou interview, supra note 9.
48 Id.
"' The regulation was approved by the State Council on 26 July 1980.
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capacity for the ministries and departments. Its functions are to
establish contacts with potential foreign investors in order to
raise funds and acquire advanced technology and equipment; to
put foreign investors in touch with "interested counterparts in
China for the purpose of cooperation;" and to invest monies en-
trusted to it on behalf of foreign investors and "Overseas
Chinese."5 CITIC does not have as close a relationship with local
trade authorities as the FICC. It apparently serves chiefly as a
model for local investment commissions, and maintains only infor-
mal relations with them."1 At the national level, its activities con-
sist primarily of "matchmaking" foreign companies and Chinese
corporations, and acting as an investment broker on behalf of
foreign investors.52
V. DECENTRALIZATION
The decision to decentralize the foreign trade system was made
early in 1979,"3 after it had become apparent that the ambitious
goals of the Ten Year Plan (1976-1985) were unattainable due to
low productivity, shortages of hard currency, and sectoral im-
balances. 4 Indeed, serious abuses were discovered in the "overly
concentrated management system."5 For example, production
was out of line with demand as a result of the previous rejection
of the role of the market and "repudiation of the regulatory func-
tion of the marketplace."56 Finally, blame was placed upon the
"iron rice bowl" mentality-which guaranteed salaries regardless
of production-for sapping motivation to meet or surpass produc-
tion goals, or to increase investment. 7 Especially important
among the sectoral imbalances was an overextension of capital
' Address by Chairman Rong Yi-Ren, Bureau of Foreign Experts Administration (May
12, 1980), reprinted in INVESTMENT IN CHINA, CHAIRMAN RONG'S COMMENT ON THE WORK OF
CITIC (n.d.). "Overseas Chinese" describes ethnic Chinese living outside of China and
Chinese from Hong Kong and Macao.
", Interview with Lee Wen-jie, a director of China International Trust and Investment
Commission (CITIC), in Beijing (Nov. 19, 1980).
52 Id.
" Chiang, The Restructuring of China's Foreign Trade Apparatus, ECON. REP. 34 (July
1980).
' The Five Year Plan for 1976 to 1980 was plagued by natural disasters, such as the
T'angshan earthquake, unfavorable weather, and continuing political unrest, which forced
incorporation of the plan into the Ten Year Plan. Bus. AMER. 1 (Aug. 11, 1980).
11 FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA L 34 (daily
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construction, at the expense of light industry and agriculture."
Accordingly, the central government concluded in late 1978 that a
three-year period of economic adjustment was necessary 5 and a
policy of "readjustment, consolidation, reform and improvement"
was introduced. The new policy thrust agriculture and light in-
dustry to the forefront of the economic plan.6" Of the 120 "major
projects" enumerated in the Ten Year draft (1976-1985) economic
program, some have been scaled down, some postponed, and some
cancelled as a result of the "readjustment" during the last three
years."l
Foreign trade practices came under fire by Beijing officials as
being a "major source of red tape, inefficiency, monopoly and un-
necessarily tight control.""2 Supporters of economic reform, led by
Deng Xiaoping, criticized the Ministry of Foreign Trade for failing
to promote vigorously China's exports in order to relieve
economic imbalances.' The reformers argued that China's
economic growth was dependent upon increasing importation of
equipment and advanced technology, and that foreign trade was
the means for obtaining the currency required to make these pur-
chases. Decentralization was perceived as one way to increase
foreign trade. Devolution of authority to local units in trade mat-
ters would allow foreign customers to deal directly with local pro-
cedures and enterprises, thereby obtaining high quality products
more efficiently and without the bureaucratic red tape and delays
of the central bureaucracy. Two particular aspects of decentraliza-
tion were emphasized: 1) the provinces and municipalities would
be allowed to retain approximately one-third of their export earn-
ings, which had previously been retained by MFT; and 2) the MFT
would retain control over the export of certain commodities, such
as coal, petroleum, and tungsten."
11 FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA L 15 (daily
rep., Jan. 5, 1981).
5 Tian, supra note 14, at 18.
" FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA L20 (daily rep,
Dec. 2, 1980); THIRD SESSION, supra note 1.
" The most dramatic shift in priorities under readjustment came in the postponement of
the $2 billion Baoshan steel complex agreement with Japan. Sterba, China Steel Project Is
Postponed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1981, at Dl, col. 3.
' New Trade Outlook, CHINA TRADE REP. 11 (May 1980). [Hereinafter cited as New
Trade Outlook].
63 Id.
" CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Report (classified). See discussion of the new export
licensing system under the MFT in Part V infra.
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A. Decentralization in the Municipalities
Under the newest decentralization plan the three great cities of
China, Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, have been granted new
responsibilities and privileges by the State Council. 5 Along with
Fujian and Guangdong, these cities have authority over most local
trade and investment decisions up to $1.9 million, without obtain-
ing the approval of the FICC or other central government
organs." Upon approval by the FICC, if required, discussions with
foreign companies are handled by local trade authorities. 7
The three cities have created a number of foreign trade institu-
tions to handle imports, exports, joint ventures, compensation
trade, and foreign investment capital. The most common trade
organization established has been the "local import-export com-
mission" (LIECs). Subordinate to the LIECs are four organiza-
tions: foreign trade corporations, foreign trade bureaus, foreign
exchange control bureaus, and investment and trust corporations.
Subordinate to the local foreign trade corporations are specialized
foreign trade corporation bureaus. 9 The LIECs are directly
See Terry, Doing Business with China's Three Great Cities, CHINA Bus. REV. 14
(Mar.-Apr. 1980).
" Zhou interview, supra note 9.
67 Id.
The following chart illustrates the new trade and investment structure of the PRC.
STATE COUNCIL
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THE ASIAN LETTER LIMITED, THE CHINA LETTER, SPECIAL REPORT 2 (Supp. No. 108, Oct.
1980).
" Terry, supra note 65, at 14.
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responsible to the provincial or municipal governments. LIECs
promote and develop trade (including counter trade and licensing)
and oversee all imports and exports in each jurisdiction. They
supervise the foreign trade corporations and investment corpora-
tions, as well as branches of the national FTCs. In addition, the
LIECs coordinate all investment proposals received from lower
units, and review all financial commitments made by the cities.
Their responsibilities include giving final approval for all projects
within their domain and forwarding to the FICC joint ventures
that require its approval. The LIECs do not, however, negotiate
business arrangements or enter into contracts.
The foreign trade corporations oversee the actual business of
importing and exporting. Their relationships with branches of the
national FTCs are evolving. For the time being, they are con-
trolled both by the MFT and the local authorities, usually through
the LIECs.
The local foreign trade bureaus are responsible for ad-
ministrative matters involving foreign trade. They have been
described as the remaining link between the MFT and the
developing local trade structures. Through the local trade
bureaus, the MFT continues to play a role in the coordination of
trade by means of controlling the local branches of the national
FTCs. Unlike the LIECs, the local bureaus are engaged actively in
trade, and have authority to execute contracts. Examples of their
responsibilities include the issuance of export licenses and the
negotiation of export processing arrangements with foreign firms.
The functions of the local foreign exchange control bureaus are
undefined, although it is apparent that they will work with the
LIECs in regulating the flow of foreign exchange.
The local investment corporations are linked informally to the
CITIC. These corporations are responsible to the provincial or
municipal governments, and are supervised directly by the
LIECs. Their activities include introducing foreign investors and
promoting foreign investments, assisting with compensation trade
arrangements, issuing bonds and arranging bank loans, and pro-
viding information and consultation services for investors. In addi-
tion, local investment corporations assist in organizing joint ven-
tures between municipal corporations and foreign firms.70
Beijing's LIEC (BIMPEC) was formed in October 1979. The Beij-
ing Economic Development Corporation (BEDC) was established
", Id. at 15. See also THE ASIA LETTER LTD., THE CHINA LETTER 4 (No. 109, Nov. 1980).
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to control compensation trade and technical service projects. The
Beijing International Trust and Investment Corporation (BITIC)
administers loans. Beijing's local foreign trade corporation is com-
prised of ten sub-branches (each responsible for a type of export,
including textiles, light industrial goods, arts and crafts, metals
and minerals, and machinery) and subsidiaries that manage
transportation and storage and the packaging and advertising of
export commodities. The local corporation is empowered to
negotiate directly with foreign companies. It also has the author-
ity to supervise local branch agencies of the national FTCs. There
have been reports that the Beijing FTC will focus its efforts on
the export of textiles, light industrial goods, and handicrafts. 1
Tianjin set up its foreign trade LIEC (TIMPEX) in March 1980
and the city's trade has expanded rapidly-trade relations with
150 countries have now been established. TIMPEX differs from
BIMPEC primarily in that TIMPEX has authority over a broader
range of products, including cereals, carpets, oil, textiles, arts and
crafts, and foodstuffs.72 The Tianjin General Foreign Economic
and Technical Service Company administers foreign contracts and
labor exports. Joint venture projects are controlled by the Tianjin
International Trust and Investment Corporation. A foreign trade
corporation has also been created.73
Shanghai's new foreign trade organizations were initiated in
early 1980. Its LIEC was inaugurated in January 1980, and like its
Beijing counterpart, oversees the city's foreign trade and subor-
dinate trade units. Its investment organization is the Shanghai In-
ternational Trust Service Corporation (SITSC). In a variation on
the practice in the other two cities, Shanghai's foreign trade cor-
poration, set up in December 1979, and national FTC branches
have agreed to split responsibilities for handling foreign trade
negotiations; the national FTC branches will handle exports, while
the local FTCs will control imports. Like its sister municipalities,
Shanghai exports light industrial products, handicrafts, and
metals. Shanghai plans to concentrate on producing more
machinery, petrochemical products, electronic products, and
equipment for small and medium-sized industries.74
According to preliminary press accounts, under the new policy
7 Chiang, supra note 53, at 35. As observed in Part IV supra, none of the local invest-
ment organizations is linked directly with CITIC.
7' Terry, supra note 65, at 17; see also New Trade Outlook, supra note 62, at 11.
T Terry, supra note 65, at 16; see also Chiang, supra note 53, at 35.
T Id. at 35; see also Terry, supra note 65, at 16.
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of retention of foreign exchange earnings, Beijing will retain forty
percent of its earnings and Shanghai thirty percent, provided that
their foreign trade targets are met. 5 The foreign currency earn-
ings will be distributed among factories, municipal governments,
and the foreign trade bureaus. 6
B. Decentralization in the Provinces-Special Economic Zones
At the same time the three municipalities were granted ex-
panded trade authority, the State Council gave Guangdong and
Fujian Provinces powers to carry out foreign trade and invest-
ment, and compensation trade, independent of central control.7
Both Guangdong and Fujian have established import-export com-
missions, foreign trade bureaus, and general foreign trade cor-
porations." In May 1979, Fujian established an investment com-
pany, the Fujian Provincial Enterprise Company. Like the invest-
ment corporations in the municipalities, it can engage in compen-
satory trade and assist, as well as enter into, joint ventures with
foreign companies. Its main source of funds will be from overseas
Chinese."9 In Guandong, the Guangdong Provincial Trust and In-
vestment Corporation was established to handle joint ventures
and financial dealings with overseas interests. It operates under
the aegis of the provincial government with assets of $13 million.
The corporation has announced that it will accept fixed interest
deposits and issue shares expressed in Chinese currency and
Hong Kong and United States dollars. 0 Both Fujian and
Guangdong have set up their own FTCs, LIECs, and foreign trade
bureaus.
Five Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have been announced for
the two provinces, although not all are presently being developed.
The zones, located in underdeveloped areas near Hong Kong and
the coast of the South China Sea, are concentrated upon light in-
Id. at 20.
75 Id.
" A State Council directive in July 1979 authorized the establishment of the zones. See
Kamm, Importing Some of Hong Kong ... Exporting Some of China, CHINA Bus. REV. 28
(Mar.-Apr. 1980).
"' Chiang, supra note 53, at 34-35.
Reynolds, The Joint Venture Law of the People's Republic of China: Preliminary
Assessment, 14 INT'L LAW. 31, 36 (1980).
'o Rasmussen & Theroux, Legal Aspects of Trade with China: Policies, Trends and
Developments 31 (Aug. 1980) (unpublished manuscript by attorneys at the law firm of Baker
& McKenzie in Washington D.C.). The corporation has assets of $1.5 million. See also




dustries, with intensive overseas Chinese and other foreign in-
vestment. The Chinese government designed the zones to be self-
contained enclaves, which will earn foreign exchange to pay for
necessary plants and equipment, as well as to aid China's overall
foreign exchange position. The "spheres" of potential businesses
and industries anticipated for the SEZs are broad. Agriculture,
animal husbandry, residential and construction industries, high
technology research, and technology industries are types of enter-
prises the government plans to establish."s
The four zones in Guangdong Province are:
1) Shenzhen-on the Guangdong/Hong Kong border;
2) Zhuhai-on the Macao and Guangdong border;
3) Shekou-a port on the Pearl River, near the Hong Kong
border; and
4) Shantou-near the Fujian/Hong Kong border.
Of the four SEZs located in Guangdong, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and
Shantou presently have authority to conclude trade contracts in
the nature of compensation trade or joint ventures up to a value
of $2 million without central authority approval. Shekou is in the
process of being developed for joint ventures. Shenzhen, the most
developed SEZ at this point, has concluded contractual
agreements primarily with overseas Chinese. Its infrastructure is
being improved to facilitate industrialization, including the con-
struction of highways and a power grid connected with Hong
Kong, Shanghai, and Gaungzhou. 2 There have been reports that
sixty factories already have begun operations, but it is not clear
what the main types of industries or products will be. 3 Shantou
has designated an area within the city as an SEZ to develop light
industry," embroidery, and foodstuffs.
At the August 1980 Session of the Fifth NPC, regulations were
prescribed for three SEZs in Guangdong. s" The Guangdong Pro-
vincial Administration was created to "exercise unified manage-
ment"" of the SEZs. Applications for joint ventures and in-
" JOINT PUBLICATION RESEARCH SERVICE-CHINA REPORT, Economic Affairs No. 100, at 8-9
(Dec. 2, 1980).
', Rasmussen & Theroux, supra note 80, at 4.
DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 2, at 19.
Rasmussen & Theroux, supra note 80, at 4.
8 THIRD SESSION, supra note 1; 1980 REGULATIONS ON SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES, supra
note 9. The regulations cover Shenzhen, Shantou and Zhuhai. See Guangdong Rules Cloud
More Issues Than They Clarify, 6 Bus. CHINA 137 (1980).
" 1980 REGULATIONS ON SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES, supra note 9, art. 3.
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vestments must be made to it.87 The regulations provide special
tax treatment for investors with a corporate tax rate of fifteen
percent.88 Investors who reinvest in the SEZs for five years and
longer can apply for exemption from an income tax on profits. 9
Fujian, one of the poorest provinces in the PRC, is seeking to
take advantage of its proximity to Taiwan and its connections
with numerous overseas Chinese to develop foreign trade within
its special zones." Xiamen is a national SEZ in Fujian. Huli (a port)
and Xinglin are parts of Xiamen and are being developed as
special economic zones, primarily at the provincial level. Hul,
within the Xiamen municipality, was assigned top priority by the
State Council in May 1980.2' It will be developed prior to Xinglin
and Langqi because of its proximity to a major port, (Xiamen)
through which one-half of the province's foreign trade passes.92
Some of the advantages Hul offers foreign businesses are:
1) materials imported for processing or construction will be
given tax-exempt status;
2) exports will be tax exempt;
3) a three to five year tax holiday will be granted to enter-
prises located there;
4) Xiamen will supply all utilities free of cost, including roads,
water, electricity and telephone service; and
5) within the limits of Chinese law, foreign managers will have
total control in factories which are 100% owned by foreign
investors. 3
The State Council also decided to postpone development of Langqi
because of its poor connection with Fuzhou, and its inadequate
power and water supplies . 4 Xinglin may be developed after pro-
gress at Huli is under way. Electric utilities, water, rail, and road
connections are adequate.95
Although it has not been accorded the powers given Fujian and
87 Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 14.
,9 Id. art. 16.
" FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 01 (daily rep.,
Dec. 10, 1980); FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 02
(daily rep., Nov. 12, 1980).
9I Terry, Decentralizing Foreign Trade-Fujian Province, CHINA Bus. REV. 11 (Sept.-Oct.
1980).
92 Id.





Guangdong, Sichuan has been moving toward adoption of a new
organizational structure for foreign trade and investment. It has
established its own local investment and trust corporation, the
Sichuan Provincial Changjiang Enterprise Company. Like the
other investment corporations, it will be involved in the creation
of joint ventures between Chinese and foreign interests."
There are other indications of the decentralization of authority
to the provinces and municipalities. In November 1980, it was an-
nounced that three of China's banks (the People's Construction
Bank of China, the People's Bank of China, and the Agricultural
Bank of China) assisted in the establishment of twelve investment
corporations in nine provinces, municipalities and autonomous
regions." The money provided by the banks to these local invest-
ment corporations is targeted to provide loans to projects needed
to increase production in line with the overall state plan.98
A number of states in the United States and Chinese provinces
have shown interest in forming trade ties and establishing "sister
state" relationships." By the summer of 1980, twenty-two
American states had sent delegations to the People's Republic. '°°
Some have initialed exchange agreements, while others have
already completed business deals. 0' Hubei and Ohio, alike in their
agricultural regions and concentrated industrial centers, have the
most extensive contacts. Firms in Ohio have signed $2 million
worth of contracts to supply chemicals, hardware, and welding
equipment.1 2 In addition, Maryland signed a sister state agree-
ment with Anhui Province."°3
VI. PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF DECENTRALIZATION
Reports of the progress of decentralization in the first two
years have been mixed. Initially, there was considerable confusion
about roles to be played and authorities to be exercised. Not sur-
prisingly, relations between the central and provincial foreign
trade authorities were not always smooth. Furthermore, accord-
THE ASIA LETTER LIMITED, THE CHINA LETTER 4 (No. 109, Nov. 1980).
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA L33 (daily rep.,
Nov. 26, 1980).
"Id.
" The movement was initiated by President Carter at a 1978 National Governors
Association meeting.
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ing to press accounts, the Ministry of Foreign Trade has shown
resistance to the movement."4 In the summer of 1980, regulations
for an export permit system were announced, which returned to
the MFT some degree of veto power over exports. 05 Under the
regulations, Chinese companies seeking to export certain com-
modities must apply for an export permit from either the MFT or
local foreign trade bureaus. The regulations cover import and ex-
port corporations under the Ministry, as well as local FTCs."'
In addition, there have been press accounts of local authorities
criticizing the central trade organs. Under the recently pro-
mulgated regulations for SEZs in Guangdong,'0 7 approximately
ninety-five industrial enterprises have been allowed to experi-
ment with greater decisionmaking powers. 108 A major problem has
arisen due to the central government's failure to return to the
Guangdong flashlight industry company $12.8 million in foreign
sales earned by it in 1979.' 9 Local authorities contended that the
central authorities should have returned $50,000."' Press accounts
concluded that "some commerce and foreign trade departments
still act according to outdated practices, which creates one barrier
after another for enterprises trying to sell their products through
their own channels.""'
Mismanagement of local business and trade practices has aroused
criticism from local and central authorities alike."2 Under a nation-
wide program, local factories were allowed more authority to set
production goals, set prices, and invest profits. It was reported
that some factories diverted funds to build factories not within
the central plan, raised prices, or began producing consumer
goods in competition with other plants.' 3
On the positive side, there are accounts that decentralization
has increased trade. In 1980, both Shanghai and Fujian reported
sizeable increases in exports, which were attributed to the new
Provincial FTCs Should Be Early Stop on Road to Selling to PRC, 13 Bus. CHINA 109
(1980).
10' CHINA ECON. NEWS 3 (July 19, 1980).
106 Id.
107 1980 REGULATIONS ON SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES, supra note 9, at 28.
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foreign trade marketing approaches."4 Another report described
the "proliferation of PRC trade and business organizations" as
resulting in "swaths" being cut through the bureaucracy to
"quicker, more efficient dealings," and cited the establishment of
the local foreign trade corporations as a good example."1 '
VII. CONCLUSION
In the words of a commentator on the current Chinese economic
scene:
The Chinese economic system is being revolutionized-de-
revolutionized might be a better word-to give free-market
forces greater play. It is happening slowly, piecemeal and
sporadically-there is a countertrend at the moment to more
central control-but it is happening. The changes of the last two
years, if carried to their logical conclusion, will completely
transform the economy. '
The indications are that, despite initial problems and bureaucratic
opposition, decentralization will continue, and that in the coming
decade, barring a major political or economic upheaval, all of the
provinces will establish foreign trade systems, with foreign trade
corporations and import-export commissions.1' However, predic-
tions that by 1981 other provinces would develop trade institu-
tions modeled on those of the two provinces and three
municipalities are premature. From a vertical, heavily-centralized
regime of foreign trade management under the MFT and its
FTCs, there has been a shift to horizontal control, with the new in-
stitutions taking over the actual supervision of trade, as well as
responsibility for particular trade activities.
The pause in the movement for economic reform for "readjust-
ment" is not a change of direction, or a step backwards. In the
words of Deputy Prime Minister Bo Yibo:
If it appears that it is a retreat, it may coincide with a Chinese
saying that you have to step back in order to jump forward."'
"' New Trade Outlook, supra note 62, at 11.
Provincial FTCs Should Be Early Stop on Road to Selling to PRC, 6 Bus. CHINA 109
(1980).
"' Ching, Despite Setbacks, China Continues Movement Toward A Freer Economy,
Asian Wall Street J. Weekly, Jan. 12, 1981, at 2, col. 1.
"" China Wire, CHINA Bus. REV. 3 (Sept.-Oct. 1980); JOINT PUBLICATION RESEARCH
SERVICE-CHINA REPORT, Economic Affairs No. 94, 88 (Nov. 3, 1980).
' Smith, China's Reappraisal Hampers U.S. Trade. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1980, at D17,
col. 1.
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"Readjustment" is a slowdown, a change of pace, directed toward
correcting imbalances created by the early over-emphasis on
capital construction. "Recentralization" has occurred so far only in
the reduction of expenditures on capital construction, and the
reassertion of central authority over such expenditures. "9
The central government will continue to assert leadership in in-
dustries, such as construction, that have national strategic impor-
tance. It will also maintain control in allocating crucial goods and
resources, such as military equipment, energy resources such as
oil and minerals, and staple goods such as cotton. And, of course,
the central authorities will manipulate interprovincial and foreign
trade generally, through the mechanisms of fiscal and banking
management and authority over wages and prices.
It is too early to predict whether China's new foreign trade
structure and entities will survive in their present form. They
must stand the tests of domestic opposition and foreign
businessmen's demands. China's modernization thrust depends on
acquisition of foreign currency and foreign technology. China's
leaders appear confident that an efficient and responsive foreign
trade system will be created out of the decentralization policies
they are pursuing and that such a system will be an essential part
of a modern China by the year 2000.
119 FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA L15 (daily
rep., Jan. 5, 1981).
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